

Curbing Local Centralism: Testing the Spur Power of the Village Consultative Body in Governance Supervision

Barozi*, Rumsari Hadi Sumarto

Sekolah Tinggi Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa STPMD “APMD” Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Email: guzie161974@gmail.com*, rumsarimpa@gmail.com

Keywords:

BPKal; checks and balances;
executive-heavy governance;
Sleman Regional Regulation No.
3/2023; supervisory procedures

Abstract

The extension of the village head's term of office to eight years under Law No. 3 of 2024 has increased the importance of effective checks and balances in village governance. This study examined the institutional capacity of the Badan Permusyawaratan Kalurahan (BPKal, Kalurahan Consultative Body) in Sleman Regency to supervise village administration following the enactment of Sleman Regency Regional Regulation No. 3 of 2023. Employing a descriptive qualitative approach with a critical case study design, the research collected data through semi-structured interviews, field observations, and document reviews. Data were analyzed using an interactive model involving data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. The findings revealed a significant gap between BPKal's formal supervisory authority and its practical implementation. The primary challenges included limited capacity to draft local regulations, predominantly retrospective budget oversight, the absence of standardized internal supervisory procedures, restricted access to government accountability information, and sociocultural reluctance to challenge village executive authorities. To address these challenges, the study proposed three institutional reform strategies: establishing a three-stage cyclical supervision mechanism, strengthening the exercise of legislative initiative through public hearings, and promoting inclusive thematic deliberations supported by a community aspiration monitoring matrix. These strategies were designed to enhance BPKal's institutional effectiveness, strengthen accountability, and mitigate the concentration of executive authority in village governance. The study contributed an institutional reform perspective that emphasized non-digital governance mechanisms by integrating legal authority, implementation capacity, and local sociocultural dynamics into a framework for strengthening village government supervision.



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INTRODUCTION

Local governance in Indonesia entered a new institutional phase following the enactment of Law No. 3 of 2024, which amended the Village Law and extended village heads' terms of office to eight years. This legislative amendment not only changed the formal duration of executive authority but also influenced political incentives and interinstitutional relationships that shape governance at the grassroots level. In this context, the extension of

executive tenure has increased the importance of effective institutional supervision, accountability mechanisms, and checks and balances to maintain democratic governance at the village level.

The extension of village heads' terms of office was intended to promote political stability and ensure greater continuity in village development planning and implementation. However, from a democratic governance perspective, prolonged executive tenure may also increase discretionary authority, reinforce patronage networks, and consolidate control over budgetary resources, particularly when oversight institutions lack sufficient independence and capacity. These circumstances may create an executive-dominated governance structure in which administrative stability is prioritized at the expense of meaningful institutional oversight, public accountability, and democratic participation.

An effective local accountability system therefore requires representative institutions capable of exercising legislative initiative, supervising executive performance, and accommodating community aspirations. Such institutions play a critical role in maintaining the balance of power between village executives and representative bodies while ensuring that public interests are reflected in local policymaking. However, when institutional capacity, independence, and access to information remain limited, formally established supervisory authority may become restricted to administrative approval of decisions already made by executive officials. These conditions can undermine participatory governance, weaken institutional accountability, and increase the risk of local centralism through the concentration of decision-making authority within village executive structures (Law No. 6 of 2014 Concerning Villages. Statute Book of the Republic of Indonesia No, 2014; Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs Number 110 of 2016 Concerning Village Consultative Bodies, 2016; Sleman Regency Regional Regulation Number 3 of 2023 Concerning the Village Consultative Body, 2023; Sartika, 2023; Sutrisna, 2021; Syugiarto & Tinggogoy, 2026).

The Special Region of Yogyakarta provides a distinctive institutional context because village governance operates within the framework of the region's special autonomy, as established under Law No. 13 of 2012. Within this framework, *kalurahan* institutions perform administrative and governance functions while exercising authority associated with local origins and managing resources linked to Yogyakarta's special autonomy arrangements. Sleman Regency subsequently enacted Regional Regulation No. 3 of 2023 concerning the *Badan Permusyawaratan Kalurahan* (BPKal, Kalurahan Consultative Body), establishing a specific regulatory framework for its institutional responsibilities and supervisory functions. This regulatory arrangement provides the immediate legal and institutional foundation for examining BPKal's role in maintaining accountability and balancing executive authority within *kalurahan* governance.

Under Sleman Regency Regional Regulation No. 3 of 2023, BPKal serves as a representative institution responsible for discussing and agreeing on draft *kalurahan* regulations with the *lurah* (head of the *kalurahan*), supervising the performance of *kalurahan* government, and accommodating and channeling community aspirations. Its supervisory responsibilities include monitoring the implementation of the *Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Kalurahan* (APBKal, Kalurahan Revenue and Expenditure Budget) and other government programs within the scope of its legally prescribed authority. Through these functions, BPKal is expected to promote transparency, facilitate community participation, and strengthen accountability in local development planning and governance. From a normative perspective, these responsibilities position BPKal as an essential institutional mechanism for preventing the

excessive concentration of executive authority and maintaining checks and balances at the kalurahan level.

The empirical problem identified in this study concerned the gap between BPKal's formally established supervisory authority and its implementation in practice. The findings indicated that executive-initiated proposals dominated the formulation of kalurahan regulations, while budgetary supervision was predominantly retrospective, taking place after the completion of the fiscal year rather than continuously throughout budget implementation. As summarized in Table 1, these conditions reflected the limited exercise of legislative initiative, inadequate preventive and early-warning oversight mechanisms, and inconsistencies in the accommodation of community aspirations. Collectively, these institutional weaknesses suggested that BPKal's supervisory functions had not been fully translated into effective governance practices, potentially allowing executive authority to remain dominant in local decision-making processes. Complete and verify the bibliographic references and supporting evidence for the reported figures exceeding 85% and 70% in Table 1.

Table 1. Portrait of the Gap in the Implementation of BPKal Functions at the Village Level

Dimensions of Tasks & Functions	Normative Ideal Target (Sleman Regional Regulation No. 3/2023)	The Empirical Reality of the Field	Sociological Impact Indicators
Legislative Initiative Rights	BPKal independently designed and proposed the Perkal initiative draft.	>85% of Ranperkal comes from executives; BPKal initiative rights are at a nadir.	Local legal products are <i>executive-heavy</i> and have minimal citizen breakthroughs.
Supervision of APBKal & Privilege Fund	Circular supervision from the planning, implementation, to LPJ stages.	>70% of supervision is retrospective (<i>post-factum</i>) at the time of submission of LKPPKal.	Weak control over the effectiveness of capital expenditure and Special Funds.
Aspiration Absorption	The absorption of inclusive aspirations from all levels of society.	Relying on Musdus/Muskal physical that is ceremonial and structured.	Groups with disabilities, youth, and women are less accommodated.

Source: Sleman Regional Regulation No. 3/2023; ICW (2023); and Pustaka Pemdes (2023), as cited in the manuscript. Complete bibliographic details require author confirmation.

Previous studies on Village Consultative Bodies (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa, BPD) have examined the implementation of legislative, supervisory, and community aspiration representation functions across various local governance contexts (Goggin et al., 1990; Haironi et al., 2026; Hendri et al., 2025; Mesalangil et al., 2022; Ndruru et al., 2025; Nurdiyana et al., 2022; Sakti et al., 2023). Collectively, these studies have identified recurring challenges related to institutional capacity, policy implementation, and supervisory effectiveness. However, limited attention has been devoted to understanding how the extension of village heads' terms of office interacts with the institutional capacity of the Badan Permusyawaratan Kalurahan (BPKal, Kalurahan Consultative Body), local sociocultural dynamics, and operational supervisory mechanisms in Sleman Regency. This limitation highlights the need for a more integrated examination of the institutional and contextual factors influencing the effectiveness of representative oversight in kalurahan governance.

The research gap is therefore both institutional and contextual, as existing studies have predominantly evaluated formal institutional functions or specific challenges associated with their implementation without comprehensively examining the interactions among legal

authority, institutional capacity, policy implementation, and sociocultural constraints. This study addresses that gap by integrating these dimensions into a unified analytical framework for examining kalurahan governance following the enactment of Sleman Regency Regional Regulation No. 3 of 2023. The novelty of this research lies in its emphasis on non-digital institutional reform through the integration of Kooiman's governance framework, Edwards III's policy implementation model, public policy analysis, and the principle of checks and balances. This interdisciplinary perspective provides a more comprehensive understanding of how formal supervisory authority can be translated into effective institutional practices within the distinctive administrative and sociocultural context of Sleman Regency.

The urgency of this research arises from the potential for extended village executive tenure to reinforce existing institutional weaknesses when representative oversight bodies lack adequate technical capacity, operational independence, and standardized supervisory procedures. Without effective preventive and participatory oversight mechanisms, prolonged executive authority may increase the risk of concentrated decision-making power and weaken accountability within kalurahan governance. To address these challenges, this study proposes three institutional reform strategies: establishing a three-stage cyclical supervision procedure, strengthening legislative initiative through public hearings, and promoting inclusive thematic deliberations supported by a community aspiration monitoring matrix. These proposed mechanisms are intended to enhance preventive supervision, strengthen public participation, improve the traceability of community aspirations, and reinforce institutional accountability without relying exclusively on digital transformation as the primary governance solution.

Accordingly, this study aims to identify the structural, operational, and sociocultural factors constraining BPKal's supervisory effectiveness, examine the implications of executive-dominated kalurahan governance following the enactment of Law No. 3 of 2024, and formulate institutional strategies for strengthening representative oversight in Sleman Regency. The study contributes to local governance scholarship by integrating formal legal authority, institutional capacity, policy implementation, and sociocultural dynamics into a comprehensive framework for understanding the effectiveness of village-level checks and balances. From a practical perspective, the findings are expected to provide evidence-based recommendations for the Sleman Regency Government, BPKal members, and other relevant stakeholders seeking to strengthen institutional accountability, improve supervisory procedures, expand meaningful community participation, and promote more transparent, balanced, and participatory kalurahan governance.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study employed a descriptive qualitative approach with a critical case study design to examine the supervisory role of the Badan Permusyawaratan Kalurahan (BPKal) in Sleman Regency following the enactment of Sleman Regency Regional Regulation No. 3 of 2023. The research focused on the relationship between formal institutional authority, supervisory practices, and sociocultural dynamics influencing local governance.

Data were collected through in-depth interviews, field observations, and document reviews. The documentary sources included regional regulations, kalurahan regulations, budgetary and accountability documents, and government performance reports relevant to BPKal's supervisory functions. Interviews and observations were conducted to examine institutional practices, supervisory challenges, power relations, and community participation in kalurahan governance.

Data were analyzed using the interactive model developed by (Miles & Huberman, 2014), Huberman, and Saldaña (2014), which involved data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. The analysis focused on institutional capacity, policy implementation constraints, supervisory mechanisms, power relations, and the management of community aspirations. Evidence from interviews, field observations, and documentary sources was compared to identify recurring themes, examine inconsistencies, and strengthen the credibility of the findings.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results of the study show the dynamics of inequality in power relations between BPKal and the executive after the enactment of the Sleman Regency Regulation No. 3 of 2023. The existence of the right of legislative initiative and budget supervision owned by BPKal is still trapped in administrative formalism, where the executive dominates the drafting of more than 85% of draft regulations and budgeting documents. This condition puts BPKal in a passive position that only receives documents in the final stage without substantial involvement since the initial phase of planning.

In addition, the results of the inventory of supervisory instruments indicate that BPKal's operational control function has not been running optimally at the field level. The absence of adequate Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for supervisory work procedures, limited access to *real-time financial accountability documents*, and lack of operational budget allocation are major structural obstacles for BPKal members in evaluating the effectiveness of the implementation of executive work programs independently.

This condition is strengthened by empirical facts where the budget supervision pattern applied by BPKal is more retrospective (*post-factum*) which is only carried out at the end of the fiscal year. The implication is that the ongoing supervision mechanism fails to function as an early *warning system* and is unable to anticipate or prevent deviations in the implementation of public policies carried out by the executive.

The phenomenon of the absence of BPKal's function confirms the existence of a *gaping policy-implementation gap* between the ideal norms in Sleman Regional Regulation No. 3/2023 (*das sollen*) and the empirical reality in the field (*das sein*). Referring to (Montesquieu, 1748), the extension of the term of office of the Village Head to 8 years based on Law No. 3/2024 has the potential to strengthen the accumulation of executive power (*executive heavy*) and local patronage if it is not balanced by an independent BPKal.

From the perspective of Public Policy Theory (Dunn, 2018) and (Dye, 2015), the dominance of the executive in the formulation of Perkal and APBKal dismisses the role of BPKal in distributing public aspirations. This is in line with Kooiman's Governing Theory (2003), where the limited *governing capacity* of BPKal, especially in legal literacy and legal *drafting technical skills*, has a direct impact on the deterioration of the quality of the *governing process* and *governance outcomes* of legal products produced at the village level.

In more depth, Jan (Kooiman, 2003) emphasizes that *governance* at the village level should be an arena for multi-actor interaction that is dynamic and non-hierarchical. However, empirical reality shows that there is a deviation where the interaction between BPKal and Lurah is still asymmetrical. BPKal's *limited governing capacity* in both the realm of internal instruments, regulatory control, and social legitimacy causes BPKal to be unable to position itself as an equal partner in the *governing process*, so that the space for negotiation and political bargaining is fully controlled by the executive. The implication is that *the resulting governance*

outcome not only fails to reflect the principle of accountability in the management of the APBKal and the Special Fund, but also eliminates the participation and articulation of the interests of the local community in the formation of the sub-district legal product.

If dissected through the (Edwards III, 1980) Policy Implementation Model, the failure to optimize the role of BPKal stems from four critical variables that are interrelated. These variables include the lack of optimal communication of technical instructions from the Sleman Regional Regulation No. 3/2023 from the Regency Government, the lack of operational budget resources and limited accessibility of APBKal and Special Fund data, the weak political disposition of BPKal to exercise control over the performance of the Village Head, and the lack of an adequate bureaucratic structure in the form of SOPs for BPKal supervision procedures.

This structural condition is further exacerbated by socio-cultural barriers *and* paternalistic relations in the political anthropology of rural Java. The reluctance and reluctance to reprimand the village head causes balancing criticism to often be perceived as a form of personal confrontation, which ultimately kills the overall function of *checks and balances* of BPKal.

CONCLUSION

This study concluded that the formal supervisory authority of the Badan Permusyawaratan Kalurahan (BPKal, Kalurahan Consultative Body), as established under Sleman Regency Regional Regulation No. 3 of 2023, had not been fully translated into effective operational supervision of kalurahan governance. The findings identified several major constraints, including executive dominance in regulatory and budgetary processes, predominantly retrospective supervision, limited legal drafting capacity, the absence of internal supervisory standard operating procedures (SOPs), restricted access to government accountability information, and sociocultural reluctance to challenge village executive authorities. These institutional and structural weaknesses undermined BPKal's governance capacity and limited the effectiveness of checks and balances, often reducing supervisory functions to procedural formalities rather than substantive accountability mechanisms. To address these challenges, the study recommended institutionalizing a three-stage cyclical supervision mechanism, strengthening legislative initiative through public hearings, promoting inclusive thematic deliberations, improving technical guidance from the Sleman Regency Government, and providing continuous capacity-building programs in legal drafting and regulatory oversight. These measures were expected to enhance institutional independence, strengthen preventive supervision, and promote more transparent, accountable, and participatory kalurahan governance.

Future research should adopt comparative case study approaches involving multiple kalurahan across Sleman Regency and other regions to examine variations in institutional capacity, local political dynamics, and sociocultural conditions influencing supervisory effectiveness. Further studies could employ longitudinal research designs and more extensive qualitative evidence, including in-depth interviews, field observations, and documentary analysis, to assess the implementation and effectiveness of the proposed supervisory mechanisms over time. Particular attention should be given to evaluating whether standardized supervisory procedures, strengthened legislative participation, and more inclusive community deliberations contribute to measurable improvements in government accountability, institutional checks and balances, and citizen participation. Such investigations would provide

stronger empirical evidence to support the refinement of institutional reform strategies and the development of more effective, participatory, and accountable village governance systems.

FUNDING

The research and preparation of this article was carried out independently without funding support from external parties.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author states that there are no conflicts of interest, whether personal, commercial, or financial, that can affect the implementation and results of this study.

AUTHOR'S CONTRIBUTION

Barozi contributes to research design, data collection and processing, system development, result analysis, and article manuscript preparation.

GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE USAGE STATEMENT

In the process of compiling this article, the author uses generative artificial intelligence (AI) as a tool in language refinement, writing structure, and grammar improvement. The use of AI is carried out on a limited basis and remains under the supervision of the author. All data, analysis, interpretation, and scientific substance in this article have been checked and verified by the author. The author is solely responsible for the accuracy, authenticity, and final content of the manuscript.

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